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ABSTRACT
Drawing on the variation in financial distress across U.S. states during the Great Depression, this
article suggests how bank supervision and regulation affected banking stability during the Great
Depression. In response to well-organized interest groups and public concern over the bank failures
of the 1920s, many U.S. states adopted supervisory and regulatory standards that undermined the
stability of state banking systems in the 1930s. Those states that prohibited branch banking, had
higher reserve requirements, granted their supervisors longer term lengths, or restricted the ability
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I. INTRODUCTION 
  Costly banking crises in both developing and industrial economies over the past several 
decades have rekindled interest in understanding how supervisory and regulatory structures affect 
the stability of banking systems.
1 Led by the Basel Committee, policymakers have responded by 
providing a blueprint for harmonizing banking supervision throughout the world.
2 What has been 
slower to emerge is a consensus on how bank supervision and regulation affect financial stability, 
and which supervisory practices or quantitative rules, in particular, promote or discourage 
financial stability. Analysis has been hampered in part by the difficulty of assembling data with 
sufficient cross-sectional variation to test competing theories.
3  
Prudential regulation was also of interest to policymakers of the 1930s, when there were 
significant banking crises both within and across countries.
4 In the United States, for example, 
over a third of all commercial banks suspended operations. What is less appreciated is the degree 
to which banking distress varied across U.S. states (Figure 1), and the extent to which state 
banking departments had established different prudential regimes. State banking departments and 
legislatures, acting independently of one another, had instituted their own reserve and capital 
requirements and branching laws for state-chartered banks. And in contrast to national banks 
(which had a uniform system of supervision operating through the Office of the Comptroller of 
Currency), state banking departments differed significantly in terms of the quality of their 
supervision and their authority to charter and liquidate state-chartered banks. 
                                                           
1 For a discussion of prudential standards, see Folkerts-Landau and Lindgren (1998) and Herring and Litan 
(1995). For discussion of recent crises, see Caprio and Klingebiel (1996). 
2 The Basel Committee’s “Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision” outlines 25 basic standards 
relating to preconditions for effective supervision, licensing and structure, prudential regulation and 
requirements, methods of ongoing supervision, information requirements, formal powers of supervisors, 
and cross-border banking.  
3 Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001a) have assembled invaluable data on recent regulatory and supervisory 
practices across 170 countries. However, since much of the data post-date the financial crises of the last 
two decades, the ability to test and quantify how supervision and regulation affect financial stability is 
somewhat limited (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2001b, p.31). Rossi (1999) has also examined these issues 
for a small sample of 15 developing countries. 
4  Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Bernanke and James (1991), and Grossman (1994). For a discussion of 
prudential regulation from the 1930s, see Study Commission for Indiana Financial Institutions (1932).   2 
 
Drawing on this rich cross-sectional and time-series variation of U.S. states, this article 
examines whether differences in prudential supervision and regulation help account for the 
regional variation in state bank suspension rates and the shares of total assets and deposits in 
suspended institutions during the Great Depression. In contrast to previous research that has not 
addressed the role of bank supervision (Grossman 1994; Wheelock 1995; Wicker 1996), this 
paper utilizes a new historical data set with information on the authority and quality of state 
banking departments, as well as data on prudential regulations and branching laws, to test 
explicitly both pillars of the institutional environment. Since supervision and regulation work 
together to influence bank behavior and systemic stability (Mishkin 2001), estimating both 
factors reduces the likelihood of omitted variables bias and provides greater insight into how the 
overall policy environment affected financial stability.  
Examining the variation in financial distress across states rather than countries may also 
produce better empirical estimates of the effects of bank regulation and supervision on financial 
stability. First, they may be less susceptible to omitted variables bias since countries likely differ 
in additional ways (other than supervision and regulation) that influence financial fragility. 
Second, even if observable differences such as financial development, legal systems, and political 
systems can be accounted for, differences in financial stability due to unobservable characteristics 
will also likely be more pronounced for countries than for states. Using state data thus mitigates 
the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. Third, accounting for the simultaneity between 
financial instability and economic conditions is a thorny estimation that is made more tractable in 
the context of the U.S. dual banking system. National bank failure rates can be used to control for 
shocks affecting all banks within a state since they were uniformly supervised and regulated by 
the Office of the Comptroller of Currency. 
The analysis also places the regulatory environment squarely in the context of politics 
and history in order to analyze both the causes and consequences of state bank regulation during 
the Great Depression. In the spirit of recent research emphasizing how bank regulations are 
produced (for example, Kroszner and Strahan 1999, 2001), competing theories of regulation are   3 
 
used to inform the selection of instrumental variables in order to deal with the potential 
endogeneity of bank regulation.  
This article shows that differences in state bank regulations and supervisory structures 
help explain why the banking crisis of the Depression was worse in some regions of the U.S. As a 
result of the private motives of interest groups and the public response to previous banking crises, 
some states adopted stricter reserve requirements and laws forbidding branch banking; this in turn 
led to higher bank suspension rates for state banks from 1929 to 1933. Moreover, states that 
attempted to insulate their bank superintendents from political influence by lengthening the terms 
of their superintendents or giving them the sole authority to charter banks also increased the 
incentives for the banking industry to influence these regulatory agencies; this had surprising and 
counterproductive consequences during the Depression. Finally, giving regulators sufficient 
powers and resources to carry out their supervisory mandate also increased systemic safety. State 
bank suspension rates were lower in states where bank supervisors had the authority to liquidate 
banks without the court system first having to appoint a receiver, and the share of assets and 
deposits in suspended banks was smaller in states where regulators were given more resources to 
carry out examinations.  
Sections 2 provides a brief overview of the regional nature of the U.S. banking crisis 
during the Great Depression, discusses the characteristics of state bank supervision and regulation 
on the eve of the Depression, and relates them to the theoretical literature on banking stability. 
Sections 3 and 4 estimate and analyze the impact of regulatory and supervisory differences on 
state bank suspensions from 1929-33. Section 5 then tests for their impact on the share of assets 
and deposits in suspended banks and provides instrumental variable estimates.  
 
II. BANK FAILURES AND PRUDENTIAL STRUCTURES FOR STATE BANKS 
 
In a four-year period, over 9,000 commercial banks suspended operations in the U.S., the 
majority of which failed. In 1931, nearly 8 percent of all banks failed; by 1933, this figure 
reached an astounding 20 percent. As Figure 1 shows, there were also large differences in failure   4 
 
rates that existed across states, with the Midwest and South exhibiting the highest average failure 
rates from 1929-33. Bank failures also differed by charter status (Table 1). State banks (regulated 
by state banking departments) had more total failures than national banks (regulated by the Office 
of the Comptroller of Currency): 7,429 versus 2,011. This was in part due to their numerical 
superiority, but from 1929-33, failure rates for state-chartered banks were also on average nearly 
4 percentage points higher than national banks (10.2 percent versus 6.8 percent).
5 
A considerable literature exists on the causes of U.S. bank failures during the Depression 
(Friedman and Schwartz 1963; Temin 1976; White 1984; Wicker 1980, 1996; Calomiris and 
Mason 2000, 2003); however, few researchers have examined why there was significant variation 
in bank suspensions across states.
6 This article focuses on explaining the variation in suspension 
rates for state-chartered, non-Federal Reserve commercial banks since the variables of ultimate 
interest, supervision and regulation, differed across states for these financial institutions and since 
these banks experienced very high suspension rates.
7 This section relates differences in state bank 
regulation and supervision to the theoretical and empirical literature on prudential structures and 
financial stability to show how these differences may have influenced financial stability during 
the Depression. 
 
A. Branch banking laws, reserve requirements, and capital requirements 
 
The National Banking Acts of the 1860s effectively created a dual banking system 
whereby financial institutions could obtain a state bank charter from a state’s supervisory office 
                                                           
5 Differences by charter status are somewhat overstated, since the data for state banks are suspensions and 
those for national banks are receiverships (a subset of suspensions). Nevertheless, the vast majority of state 
bank suspensions are banks that eventually entered receivership, especially for the period 1929-32. Even if 
we exclude 1933, the year with the most suspensions, the difference between the rates is still large. The 
suspension rate is 7.8% for state banks and the receivership rate is 3.8% for national banks. Averages for 
individual years during the Great Depression also exhibit this gap between rates for state and national 
banks. Throughout the article, we refer to bank failures as the number of banks suspended, according to the 
Federal Reserve (1937) definition. For further discussion see footnotes 17 and 18. 
6 Gambs (1977) and Wheelock (1995) examine the Depression from a regional perspective.  
7 From 1929 to 1933, nonmember banks, the sample studied here, accounted for between 65 percent and 83 
percent of all bank failures across states. Since Fed members had direct access to the discount window but 
were also subject to different regulations than non-member state banks (e.g., capital and reserve 
requirements), we exclude them from the analysis.   5 
 
or a national bank charter from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). In theory, 
state banking departments could have adopted the supervisory and regulatory system of the 
national banking system so that prudential systems would have been homogeneous in 1929. In 
practice, state legislative decisions were influenced by well-organized interest groups (such as 
unit banks, small manufacturing firms, and insurance companies), public response to the bank 
failures and failed state deposit insurance systems of the 1920s, and to a lesser extent, 
competition with federal regulators so that branching laws, capital requirements, and reserve 
requirements differed significantly by 1929. (See the Appendix for further discussion.)  
Laws permitting branch banking are often cited as reducing financial instability by 
enabling banks to diversify their portfolios over a wider geographical area or customer base, or by 
introducing competition into a previously geographically-segmented market and removing 
inefficient banks from the system (Sprague 1903; Benston 1986; Friedman and Schwartz 1963; 
Grossman 1994; Calomiris 2000; Laderman, Schmidt, and Zimmerman 1991; Jayaratne and 
Strahan 1997, 1998; Stiroh and Strahan 2003). Although interstate or nationwide branch banking 
was prohibited, intrastate branch banking began to flourish in the 1920s despite the opposition of 
unit banks.
8 As of 1929, 25 states and the District of Columbia permitted some form of branching 
for state chartered banks (at the state, county, or city level) or did not explicitly prohibit it by law 
(Table 2); national banks, on the other hand, were constrained by OCC regulations, and were 
permitted to open branches only in home-office cities in states with legalized branching.
9 
Some researchers have also suggested that capital requirements affect the probability of 
failure of financial institutions (Hunter, Verbrugge, and Whidbee 1996). The larger the 
contributions of the shareholders or owners to capital, the greater can be the shrinkage of assets 
without impairing depositors’ claims (Dewatripont and Tirole 1994). Capital requirements can 
                                                           
8 Some state legislators and regulators were motivated to allow branching out of public concern over 
depositor safety (Mitchener 2001) or with the design of providing a competitive advantage to state-
chartered institutions vis-à-vis national banks (White, 1983). 
9 The McFadden Act of 1927 legislated that national banks and state Fed member banks were permitted to 
establish local branches in the city of their home office if a state law allowed branching; however, the 
number of branches was restricted by city size (Tippetts 1929).    6 
 
also alter bank decisions regarding risk since they could potentially serve to chasten owners (and 
their managers) from taking on excessively risky loan portfolios, thus reining in moral hazard.
10 
Because bank capital was one of the main forms of depositor protection prior to 1934 and the 
creation of federal deposit insurance (Benston and Kauffman 1994), differences in charter capital 
requirements for state banks might also account for some of the geographical variation in banking 
distress during the Great Depression. In 1929, 21 states had established capital requirements 
below the national bank requirement of $25,000 (the level applied to banks operating in cities of 
fewer than 3,000 people), and some contemporaries argued that these low capital requirements 
encouraged the formation of small unit banks, leading to “excess competition,” “overbanking,” 
and more failures in the 1920s and 1930s (Dowrie 1930; American Bankers Association 1935). 
Finally, without reserve requirements, banks may be prone to hold too few reserves since 
they are driven to compete for depositors and increase their asset portfolio returns. Such behavior 
can increase systemic risk, which suggests that a socially superior outcome is possible through 
regulation (Cothren and Waud 1994). On the other hand, prudential regulations can reduce 
monitoring incentives and result in lower quality bank portfolios (Besanko and Kanatas 1993; 
Boot and Greenbaum 1993). Reserve requirements aimed at protecting depositors from bank runs 
could thus impose a regulatory cost or burden on the level and composition of reserves a bank 
would voluntarily hold. As of 1929, all state-chartered banks faced reserve requirements on 
demand deposits, and most had rates higher than the required rate of 7 percent for Fed members 
or national banks (Table 2). 
 
B. Supervisory quality, independence, and authority  
 
Since it is difficult for depositors to monitor bank-lending activities and ensure that banks 
are not taking excessive risks, bank supervision working in conjunction with prudential regulation 
can theoretically reduce asymmetric information between depositors and banks (such as adverse 
                                                           
10 The theoretical literature is mixed. For example, Kahane (1977), Kim and Santomero (1988), and Blum 
(1999) argue that capital requirements could increase risk.    7 
 
selection and moral hazard) and improve financial stability (Mishkin 2001). Governments have 
often granted supervisory agencies authority to license banks, authorize branches, or liquidate 
banks; to make qualitative judgments about the integrity and competence of management; and to 
ensure compliance with quantitative rules or prudential ratios. The stability of state banking 
systems therefore may have been influenced not only by transparent bank regulations, but also by 
the authority of supervisors, the impartiality and objectivity of those vested with such powers, and 
the quality of the supervisory institutions.  
Folkerts-Landau and Lindgren (1998) argue that banking supervisors need sufficient 
political autonomy to resist pressure from banks, their shareholders, and government officials. In 
the 1920s and 1930s, many state bank commissioners complained that partisan politics 
undermined their ability to effectively monitor banks.
11 Because 44 of the 48 state banking 
superintendents or supervisors were appointed by a governor, some were particularly concerned 
that their ability to monitor banks or make chartering decisions was compromised by a lack of 
insulation from the governors who appointed them.
12 In 1929, many state supervisors were thus 
advocating terms of appointment that were longer than the election cycle of the governor in order 
to shield them from partisan politics.
13  
On the other hand, more autonomy (resulting from longer terms of appointment) could 
have increased the incentives for commercial bankers to expend resources in order to influence 
supervisory decisionmaking (Laffont and Tirole 1991; Martimont 1999). Resource expenditure 
aimed at influencing regulators may have undermined the soundness of the state banking system 
by promoting the issuance of charters to unsound banks, encouraging the postponement of bank 
                                                           
11 Denying banking licenses and closing banks may run counter to the interests of constituents who helped 
elect the governor. A governor might retaliate against a particularly vigilant bank superintendent by not 
reappointing him or by forcing him to reconsider licensing or receivership decisions – potentially reducing 
the quality of state bank supervision. 
12 For example, when queried about weaknesses in the statutory provisions related to the office of bank 
commissioner, the superintendent for the state of Arkansas wrote, “The bank commissioner is appointed by 
the Governor, which in some instances is bound to have a political influence upon the operation of the bank 
department” (American Bankers Association 1929).  
13 As of 1929, supervisors’ term lengths varied from two to six years; 28 states had four-year appointments. 
Gubernatorial terms varied between two and four years.   8 
 
examinations for weak banks, weakening oversight of bank risk management practices, or 
granting forbearance. Independent supervisory agencies may also be more susceptible to 
corruption and more concerned with implementing their own objectives rather than the public’s 
(Chapman and Westerfield 1942; Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2001b; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer 2002).  
  Policymakers have widely noted that the quality of supervision may have played a central 
role in worsening financial crises (Mishkin 1999; Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini 1998). The 
quality of supervision partly depends on having sufficient resources to hire and train competent 
bank examiners (Folkerts-Landau and Lindgren 1998; Neal 1942). If the examination staff is 
small in relation to the number of banks, even the most competent staff may be unable to monitor 
bank behavior, identify non-performing banks, and take appropriate regulatory intervention 
before banks became insolvent.
14 As Table 2 indicates, banks per examiner varied widely across 
US states; difference in quality of supervision thus may help explain state bank suspensions. 
Supervisory agencies lacking sufficient authority either to license or close banks may be 
incapable of preventing undercapitalized or mismanaged banks from entering the industry or 
incapable of removing cancerous banks from the system. The authority of the state bank 
supervisor to expedite the resolution of failed banks is one such power that varied across state 
banking departments (Table 2), and which could have influenced bank failure rates during the 
Depression. Having sole authority to liquidate banks is compatible with the interests of depositors 
and creditors as it leads to a faster resolution for claimants in contrast to a court-appointed 
receivership. Speedy resolution of claims can potentially reduce uncertainty and limit spillovers 
(or “contagion”) from the failing institution to the rest of the system (Folkerts-Landau and 
                                                           
14 If the decision to suspend a bank is viewed as a regulatory outcome, it is also possible that more vigilant 
supervision (as characterized here by state banking departments having more supervisors per bank) may 
have actually increased failures if examiners were concerned about negative spillovers. Moreover, if the 
examiners are paid poorly or are not full-time employees, then their incentives to uncover problems in 
banks may be weakened. This was a significant problem prior to 1913, when examiners were paid per 
examination, were not full-time employees of the state, and were expected to cover their own expenses. 
When the Fed and the OCC made bank examiners full-time, salaried employees of the state in 1913, and 
state regulatory agencies universally followed suit, these incentive problems disappeared (Robertson 1968, 
p.79; Committee on Branch, Group and Chain Banking 1931, vol.6, p.81).   9 
 
Lindgren 1998). A faster liquidation process could also limit credit-channel effects that operate 
through the assets tied up in failed banking institutions.
15 Finally, the knowledge that resolution 
occurs quickly may reduce the opportunities for managers to engage in risk taking or expect 
forbearance once they are suspended (Fry 1995).  
Insufficient authority to control the licensing or entry of new banks has also been linked 
to financial stability (Mishkin 2001). Some supervisors of state banking departments who did not 
have the sole power to deny or grant charters argued that this weakened their state banking 
systems.
16 Many banking analysts of the 1920s believed that an “overbanking” situation had 
arisen, not only from low capital requirements, but also from the lack of adequate power for 
supervisors to restrict charters (American Bankers Association 1935; Gruchy 1937; Neal 1942). 
When state bank supervisors were surveyed in 1934, several commented that having the authority 
to limit bank charters would have “aided in preventing many state bank failures in the last five 
years” (American Bankers Association 1934). On the other hand, vesting this power in the hands 
of a single regulator may lead to chartering decisions that are based on personal rather than public 





To estimate the effects of state-level differences in prudential supervision and regulation 
on state bank closures during the Great Depression, annual data on commercial bank suspensions 
from 1929-33 were collected for 48 states.
17 The data include those commercial banks that 
                                                           
15 Mason, Anari, and Kolari (2000) show that slow bank resolution involuntarily transforms liquid deposits 
into illiquid securities; during the Great Depression, this slowed the rehabilitation of insolvent debtors and 
the banking sector’s ability to make loans, and affected bank depositors’ consumption decisions. 
16 For example, the supervisor for the state of Delaware commented, “the principal elements of weakness 
[in state statutory provisions] consist in the lack of any definite restrictions which the department has over 
the establishment of new banks” (American Bankers Association, 1929). In contrast to the situation for 
many state banking authorities, the Comptroller’s office had established a system as early as 1909 that 
permitted a great degree of control over the granting of new charters for national banks; its decisionmaking 
process included evaluating economic criteria of communities where new banks were proposed. 
17 Data for commercial bank failures (excluding mutual savings banks and private banks) are from the 
Federal Reserve Board Bulletin, September 1937. “The figures for 1933 comprise banks suspended before   10 
 
suspended their operations either temporarily or permanently, unless the closure was due to a 
special bank holiday, in which case it is counted only if it remained closed.
18  
The dependent variable (SRSBit) is the suspension rate of state-chartered, non-Fed-
member banks (the set of commercial banks regulated and supervised by state banking 
departments), and is defined as the number of state-chartered banks in state i suspended for a 
given year t divided by the total number of state banks existing as of June 30 of that same year 
(expressed in percentage terms).
19 Equation 1 is estimated as follows:  
 
(1) SRSBit = β0 + β1BRANCHit + β2CAPit + β3RESit + β4SUPTERMi + 
         β5BANK/EXAMi + β6CHARTERi + β7LIQUIDATIONi + β8FRNBit + εit. 
 
CAPit is the minimum capital required of banks in small municipalities (measured in thousands of 
dollars).  RESit is the reserve requirement expressed as a percentage of country-bank demand 
deposits, and BRANCHit is the percentage of state banks with branches. The length of a 
supervisor’s term (SUPTERMi) is measured in years and the number of banks per examiner 
(BANK/EXAMi) is the value for June 1929. Liquidation authority (LIQUIDATION) and licensing 
authority (CHARTER) are indicator variables where positive values reflect states that grant their 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the banking holiday, licensed banks suspended or placed on a restricted basis following the bank holiday, 
unlicensed banks placed in liquidation or receivership, and all other unlicensed banks which were not 
granted licenses to reopen by June 30, 1933” (Federal Reserve Bulletin, September 1937, p.866). The total 
number of banks fitting one of these criteria is 4,000. 
18 To be sure, there are differences between suspended and closed banks. This paper follows the Federal 
Reserve’s convention: state bank suspensions comprise “all banks closed to the public, either temporarily 
or permanently by supervisory authorities or by the banks’ boards of directors on account of financial 
difficulties, whether on a so-called moratorium basis or otherwise, unless the closing was under a special 
bank holiday declared by civil authorities. If a bank closed under a special holiday declared by civil 
authorities and remained closed only during such holiday or part thereof, it has not been counted as a bank 
suspension” (Federal Reserve Bulletin, September 1937, p.866). Banks that become insolvent and are 
placed under receivership or that liquidate their assets voluntarily might properly be termed failures, and 
are a subset of suspensions. Federal Reserve data at the state level, however, do not permit one to 
distinguish between failures, temporary suspensions, and bank mergers. The data used here potentially 
overstate the true number of failures for state banks, but unless there is some systematic reason to believe 
that there are important regional differences between failures and suspensions, the hypotheses tested should 
not be adversely affected if suspended banks are included. Calomiris and Mason (2000, p.30) point out that 
this distinction in theory can be important, but they do not find that their results for the 1930-32 sample 
period are sensitive to the choice of failures versus suspensions. 
19 Data on the number of banks are from Board of Governors (1959).   11 
 
supervisors the authority to liquidate banks without first having a court appoint a receiver and 
states that give sole licensing authority to the supervisor.
20 Summary statistics for the regulatory 
variables are shown in Table 2. The initial identifying assumption is that the regulatory and 
supervisory aspects of banking are uncorrelated with the random element of bank failures.  
If some of the cross-state variation in failure rates for state-chartered banks is attributable 
to factors common to all commercial banks within a state, omitted variables bias is a potential 
problem. However, including factors such as state economic conditions can potentially introduce 
simultaneous equations bias (that is, economic conditions can influence bank failures and vice 
versa). Previous studies examining the effects of regulation on bank failures have not adequately 
addressed the issue of simultaneity bias.
21 A standard treatment would be to develop a system of 
equations to explain the relationship between economic conditions and bank failures; however, 
due to data limitations, it is difficult to find instruments to identify both equations. As an 
alternative to the simultaneous equations approach, we take advantage of the unique bifurcated 
nature of regulation and supervision in the U.S. dual banking system and include the failure rate 
for national banks at the state level as an additional regressor.
22 Conditioning on the national bank 
failure rate (FRNBit) will control for statewide time-varying effects common to all commercial 
                                                           
20 All supervisory variables (length of supervisors’ terms, number of examiners per bank, charter and 
liquidation authority) are from American Bankers Association (1929). Supervisory characteristics are based 
on surveys conducted during the first half of 1929. Data on reserve requirements are from the Federal 
Reserve Bulletin (1929-1934). The rate on demand deposits is used since it was the most liquid form of 
bank deposits, and most susceptible to depositor withdrawal. Data on branching laws and percentage of 
branches are from Federal Reserve Bulletin (various issues, 1929-1934). Data for capital requirements are 
from Polk’s Bankers Encyclopedia (various issues, 1929-1933). In some states, capital requirements varied 
according to the size of the municipality where the bank was established. Where this was true, the capital 
requirement for the smallest defined municipality was used (usually 3,000 people). 
21 For example, Wheelock (1995, p.30) suggests that his results on state bank regulation (he does not 
consider supervision) do not account for the feedback between the severity of the Great Depression in a 
state and bank failures in that state, and therefore suffer from simultaneous equations bias. And in their 
analysis of recent country data, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001b) do not fully address this issue. 
22 National bank failures are those banks chartered by the OCC that were placed in receivership; it does not 
include banks that suspended operations and later reopened, or those that were later absorbed. Treating the 
commercial bank data in a disaggregated fashion, where national bank failures are used merely as a control 
variable for state-specific distress, avoids the difficulty of meshing the state bank suspension series with the 
national bank liquidation series. Previous studies, such as Wheelock (1995) and Gambs (1977), use 
aggregate data on all commercial banks, and make no attempt to adjust for this discrepancy. See Calomiris 
and Mason (2000) for a further discussion of this issue.   12 
 
banks, such as business or agricultural distress. Since the regulatory and supervisory 
characteristics that we are interested in explaining only applied to state banks, there is no direct 
effect from these variables on national banks, which were solely regulated and supervised by the 
OCC. Although it is possible that specifications including the failure rate for national banks “over 
control” for common state effects, we are confident that this does not result in upwardly biased 
estimates of the impact of regulation and supervision on state bank suspensions. Moreover, 
including the failure rate of national banks has the additional advantage of conditioning state-
chartered bank failure rates on a wider set of state influences than measures such as 
unemployment, business failures, or changes in personal income.  
 
IV. ANALYSIS OF STATE BANK SUSPENSIONS 
 
Table 3 displays results from pooled, weighted least squares (WLS) regressions for the 
1929-33 period.
23 The weights are the square roots of the number of banks in each state; Eicker-
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported. Column 1 displays the results for 
a baseline regression where we regress the state nonmember failure rate on differences in 
regulation and supervision for these banks as well as exogenous state characteristics such as 
population density and the shares of a state’s population that is urban, that is employed in 
manufacturing, retail, wholesale, and agriculture, respectively. Most of the coefficients for the 
regulatory and supervisory variables enter with the expected signs and are significantly different 
from zero at standard confidence levels. Column 2 includes the national bank failure rate to 
control for state-specific factors affecting all banks during the Great Depression (as in Equation 
1). As expected, the R-squared improves, and the coefficients are similar to those reported in 
column 1, (although somewhat smaller in size), even though the national bank failure rate absorbs 
a considerable amount of variation across states. 
                                                           
23 The initial downturn in the U.S. economy occurred in 1929. Given the dramatic changes in federal 
regulation that occurred under the first Roosevelt administration (including the creation of deposit 
insurance), and the subsequent decline in failure rates in 1934, the last year included is 1933.    13 
 
States granting their supervisors the sole authority to liquidate state banks had failure 
rates that were approximately 3.5 percentage points lower. As section 2 suggested, endowing 
supervisors with this authority may have improved financial stability by reducing: (1) severity of 
credit-channel effects that are associated with unresolved bank failures; (2) contagion to the rest 
of the financial system; and (3) the likelihood that banks engage in risk taking or expect 
forbearance. The negative coefficient is also consistent with the concerns expressed by state bank 
regulators and by the Fed, which believed that giving state bank supervisors liquidation authority 
would lead to a faster liquidation process and promote a better technique for carrying out 
liquidation (Board of Governors 1931, vol.6, p.91).
24  
The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the length of the supervisor’s term 
suggests there are tradeoffs in designing supervisory structures. Longer terms for supervisors 
reduced the influence of the executive branch on state banking departments in the 1920s, but they 
also made it more attractive for representatives of the banking industry to lobby superintendents 
and gain influence over their decisions. An additional year in office raised the failure rate for 
state-chartered banks by roughly 1.6 percentage points. (The range of term lengths varied from 2 
to 6 years.) The positive sign is consistent with the theoretical literature emphasizing how 
autonomy gives regulators “enforcement freedom”: longer terms may weaken the incentives for 
regulators to act independently of individual bank interests and potentially induce them to use 
their discretionary powers (delaying examinations, granting forbearance, or issuing charters) at 
the expense of systemic safety. Consistent with Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001b) regulators 
could have used their offices to extract personal benefits or even collect bribes in a manner 
inconsistent with systemwide stability. Vickers (1994, pp.34-5) describes the situation in Florida 
in the 1920s as one where bankers knew how to prey on Comptroller Amos’s “weakness and 
greed” by providing him and his examiners with unsecured loans. “Promoters eagerly sought 
                                                           
24 As the Colorado state superintendent wrote, “The administration of banks in liquidation may be handled 
at less expense and more diligently wherein it is not necessary to constantly refer matters to the courts, 
which in many instances are extremely slow in the determination of important matters”(American Bankers 
Association 1929).   14 
 
bank charters, which regulators willingly provided. The newly sanctioned bankers then used 
depositors’ money to fund their own projects. And with their new source of money, they bought 
regulatory protection by making loans to bank officials.” Comptroller Amos was eventually 
indicted by a Palm Beach County grand jury for gross malpractice. Meanwhile, Florida 
experienced numerous failures throughout the 1920s and eventually a severe panic in 1929.  
States that granted supervisors the sole authority to issue charters also experienced 
suspension rates that were roughly 1.5 percentage points higher, although the result is only 
weakly statistically significant. Supervisors with full discretionary authority over licensing 
decisions may have destabilized the state banking system by granting charters to banks whose 
applications had been rejected by the OCC or by setting chartering criteria too low. Consistent 
with a corruption interpretation of this coefficient, some bank superintendents from the 1920s 
have acknowledged that their departments were susceptible to industry influence. As the bank 
supervisor of Oklahoma described, “For a period of about 3 years from 1919 until 1922 graft and 
corruption played a dominant role in the operation of the State Banking Department. Charters 
were to be had at a price” (Neal 1942). 
The positive and statistically significant coefficient on reserve requirements is consistent 
with the theoretical literature, which argues that prudential regulations can lead to higher failure 
rates if they induce banks to change the composition of their portfolios or reduce the incentives 
for depositors and investors to monitor bank behavior.
25 The higher implicit tax induced banks to 
increase their share of risky assets (relative to riskless) in order to increase return. 
A 10-percentage point increase in the number of state banks with branches 
(approximately a one-standard-deviation increase) reduced suspension rates by approximately 1.3 
percentage points. The negative coefficient suggests that branching stabilized state banking 
systems by introducing competition and weeding out inefficient banks through mergers or 
closures, or that branching (even within a state) enabled banks to lower their risk through 
                                                           
25 Although it is not a definitive test, since the positive sign on the reserve requirement coefficient is robust 
to the inclusion of delegated monitoring (the number of state banks per examiner), it seems that the 
regression is most likely capturing the portfolio response of banks to higher reserve requirements.   15 
 
diversification opportunities. Alternative definitions of branching do not alter this basic finding.
26 
This finding is consistent with Wheelock (1992) and Rose and Scott (1978), who find that branch 
banking at the state level had stabilizing effects in other decades, and stands in contrast to studies 
that have argued that branching has little or no stabilizing effect (Wicker 1980; Carlson 2004). 
Column 3 shows that the estimated coefficients on the regulatory and supervisory 
variables do not appear to be sensitive to the inclusion of either state-specific characteristics of 
the banking industry that may also influence banking stability or year dummies (where 1933 is 
the omitted year).
27 After controlling for other factors, the coefficients on these variables (not 
reported in the tables) enter with the correct predicted signs, but are not significantly different 
from zero at standard confidence levels. Column 4 redefines the dependent variable to be the 
difference between state and national bank failure rates. This specification may be preferable if 
feedback between the national failure rates is somehow affecting the state regulatory and 
supervisory variables. One reason this could be a problem is if competition in laxity existed 
among regulatory authorities. For example, wishing to circumvent federal restrictions on 
branching, national banks may have formed chain or group banking associations.
28 Competition 
                                                           
26 We also tested (1) the number of total branches of state banks divided by total state banks; (2) an 
indicator variable where positive values correspond to those states that permitted branch banking of any 
sort; and (3) an indicator variable where positive values correspond only to those states had legalized 
statewide branching. The sign and statistical significance on the branching coefficient were robust to these 
alternative proxies. 
27 For banking industry controls, we included: (1) a measure of concentration, since more concentrated 
banking systems may enable banks to coordinate responses to crises and build up cash reserves or a strong 
capital surplus (Demsetz 1973, 1974; Grossman 1994); (2) average deposits per state bank, since bank size 
has been linked to greater diversification opportunities, economies of scale, and larger surpluses and profits 
(Calomiris and Mason 2000; Grossman 1994; and Wheelock 1995); (3) the average riskiness of a state 
bank’s portfolio (Calomiris and Mason 2000; Carlson 2004); and (4) the average capital-asset ratio for state 
banks. The measure of concentration is the share of deposits in the largest four state banks in 1929, 
calculated using data from Polk’s Bankers Encyclopedia Co. (1929) and Board of Governors, Federal 
Reserve System (1959). Risky assets for state banks are calculated as the percentage of assets that are 
neither cash nor government bonds. Data on different types of assets, deposits, and on capital are from 
Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System (1959). We also considered two alternative measure of banks: 
(1) the percentage of a state’s state-chartered banks located in counties where the average deposits per bank 
is in the lowest third of all counties in the United States and (2) average assets per bank. The first was 
calculated using data from a data file from the ICPSR authored by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (1960). We also considered an alternative for concentration: people per bank. The results 
presented in Table 3 were not sensitive to these alternative definitions.  
28 Group banking, or collections of banks linked together through holding companies, gained prominence in 
the 1920s in response to restrictions on branching, and were used as alternative means for achieving 
economies of scale and greater portfolio diversification. Groups and chains were most common in the   16 
 
in laxity might have also been a problem in setting prudential regulations. If the Federal Reserve 
or OCC denied a bank a charter, it might seek a state charter instead; state banking authorities 
might be willing to grant it one in order to expand the number of banks under their jurisdiction. 
Regulators complained about this competition over chartering during the first quarter of the 
century (Board of Governors 1931, vol.6, p.85). Although competition in laxity was a concern of 
regulators in the 1920s and 1930s, the coefficients on the regulatory and supervisory variables 
shown in column 4 do not appear to be sensitive to our test for it. 
Because of countervailing effects, even well-intentioned regulators may have experienced 
greater suspension rates. (A correlation matrix of bank regulation and supervision is shown in 
Table 4.) That is, while state authorities may have wanted to improve stability by changing the 
regulatory environment, increasing the reserve requirement by one standard deviation while 
simultaneously extending state branch banking (by one standard deviation) would have reduced 
the stability and diversification benefits coming solely from branch banking. States nevertheless 
would have still seen their suspension rates drop by approximately 0.5 percentage points. Giving 
supervisors more authority in general also had offsetting effects since the effects of granting 
supervisors the authority both to liquidate banks and charter banks moved suspension rates in the 
opposite direction. Nevertheless, simultaneously giving both powers to supervisors reduced 
suspension rates by around 2 percentage points. Granting liquidation authority and permitting 
branch banking thus seem particularly important in driving bank stability. 
We can also get a sense of the economic significance of the results by considering what 
alternative regimes would have meant for stability. For example, what if the dual banking system 
had been abandoned and states had been forced to adopt the regulatory and supervisory standards 
that applied to national banks? This would have been a mixed blessing for states since the OCC’s 
regulatory and supervisory regime was not necessarily “best practice” in that it minimized 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Midwest and South where prohibitions on branch banking were widespread (Board of Governors 1931, 
vol.7, 1931, p.210). According to a survey conducted by the Federal Reserve Committee on Branch, Group, 
and Chain Banking, the majority of banking groups surveyed would have preferred to be part of branching 
systems rather than groups if the law permitted it (Board of Governors 1931, vol. 7, p.72). Of course, some 
of those groups in the survey were prohibited by state law rather than federal law.   17 
 
failures. The Office of the Comptroller was appointed by the President, had both liquidation and 
charter authority, and had more examiners relative to banks at his disposal than in many states 
(15.5 banks per examiner in 1929). The OCC prohibited statewide branch banking, reserve 
requirements were set at 7%, and minimum charter capital was $25,000. The annual suspension 
rate for a state bank with national bank regulatory and supervisory characteristics, holding all else 
equal (and using regression coefficients from column 3), would be 2.3 percentage points lower 
for the 1929-33 period.
29 We could instead examine what would happen if all states had moved in 
the direction of what the regressions reveal as “best practices” of the state regulators. If we adjust 
the regulatory and supervisory variables by one standard deviation in the direction of “best 
practice,” the annual suspension rate would have fallen by 5.8 percentage points. 
Finally, we tried a variety of other specifications, including count data analysis, a log 
proportions model, constraining our specification to the “between” estimator (a regression on 
group means), and restricting the sample to 1929-32 since President Roosevelt declared a banking 
holiday in 1933.
30 In each of these alternatives (not shown), the results for the key regulatory and 
supervisory variables were quite similar to those presented in Table 3.  
 
V. ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF DISTRESS AND ADDITIONAL SENSITIVITY TESTS 
 
 
A. Bank deposits and assets in suspended banks 
 
The previous section focused on bank suspensions as a measure of state banking distress 
since numerous suspensions could indicate that a banking system has expanded in an unhealthy 
fashion (perhaps due to poor regulation or supervisory practices) or that correspondent 
                                                           
29 The annual average suspension rate over the period is 11.03%. 
30 1933 may not be fully comparable with those of the previous years as the precise status of a bank was 
difficult to determine due to state bank holidays and the national bank holiday in March. The bank 
suspension figures for 1933 that were used in the other regressions included banks suspended before the 
holiday, banks placed in liquidation or receivership, and all unlicensed banks that were not granted licenses 
to reopen by June 30, 1933 (the time at which supervisory authorities had nearly completed their 
examinations of nearly all the banks not granted licenses immediately after the holiday). For count data 
analysis, we used a negative binomial distribution (due to overdispersion in the data) and including the log 
number of banks to account for the size of the “at-risk population.”   18 
 
relationships played an important role in spreading the crisis. Analyzing total assets or deposits in 
suspended or failed institutions may shed light on how well depositors were protected or whether 
particular regulatory and supervisory practices were better at limiting the size of failures 
(measured in terms of either assets or deposits). That is, lower suspension rates may indicate how 
well regulators protected banks, whereas lower shares of total deposits in suspended institutions 
may give a better sense of how effective regulators were at providing depositor protection. Table 
4 therefore re-estimates equation (1) using the (log) annual share of total state deposits located in 
suspended state-chartered banks or the (log) annual share of total loans and investments in 
suspended state-chartered banks (our measure of assets) as the dependent variable.
31  
Using these alternative dependent variables does not dramatically change the signs or 
levels of significance on the key explanatory variables. In addition to state economic conditions, 
supervisory term length (+), the extent of branch banking (–), and reserve requirements (+) seem 
particularly influential in driving the size of state bank suspensions, measured either in terms of 
assets or deposits. There are two noteworthy differences compared to the results using suspension 
rates as the dependent variable: liquidation authority is now only marginally statistically 
significant and the coefficient on banks per examiner has the correct predicted sign and is 
marginally significant. First, the marginally statistically significant coefficient on liquidation 
authority suggests that granting supervisors this authority was likely more important for 
managing the spread of suspensions via correspondent relationships rather than limiting their 
magnitude. Second, the positive sign and marginal statistical significance on the banks per 
examiner coefficient in Table 5 suggests that supervisory resources may have more bang for the 
buck in mitigating the size of failures rather than the spread of them. Facing limited resources, 
states may have focused on larger financial institutions. (This stands in contrast to the somewhat 
                                                           
31 The residuals on these two measures were not normally distributed, so we use logs. In cases, where the 
value was zero, we either dropped the observations or changed them to the arbitrarily small value of 
0.0001. The table displays the latter, although the results do not appear sensitive to the choice. Data on 
loans and investments and deposits in suspended banks are from Federal Reserve Bulletin, September 1937.   19 
 
surprising result of Table 3: that having more examiners seems to have mattered very little for 
mitigating bank suspensions.
32) 
The last two columns of Table 5 test additional aspects of the quality of supervision. We 
include the pay of examiners relative to what they could earn in the private sector, since large 
differences in compensation between bank examiners and commercial bankers have been 
associated with conflicts of interest, excessively rapid turnover of qualified staff, and inability to 
attract capable and qualified staff (Folkerts-Landau and Lindgren 1998).
33 States that paid their 
examiners more could have done a better job of examining banks and minimizing the magnitude 
of the suspensions. We also include assets per bank examiner (as of June 1929) since larger state 
banks may have required proportionately more supervisory resources to uncover problems and 
resolve them.  
All three variables measuring supervisory resources enter with the predicted signs. 
Consistent with numerous statements by state supervisors and the Fed, the negative sign on the 
wage differential suggests paying bank examiners more (relative to what they could earn in 
industry) reduced turnover, attracted more qualified employees, and increased tenure length – 
thus improving the quality of supervision.
34 The coefficients on banks per examiner and assets per 
examiner are also statistically significant at around the 10% level. The positive signs on these 
variables suggest that hiring more examiners may have enabled examiners to conduct more 
                                                           
32 We examined the sensitivity of this result in several ways. First, we looked at whether the coefficient was 
driven by any outliers in the number of banks per examiner. The data for June 1929 range from 1.5 to 75.7 
banks per examiner. We re-estimated column 3 of table 3, dropping the three states with the highest values 
(Minnesota, Georgia and Kansas), one at a time and altogether; the sign and statistical significance of the 
coefficient did not change. We then examined the DFBETAs, and did not discover any outliers for banks 
per examiner. We also estimated regressions using two other alternative definitions for supervisory 
resources: assets/deposits in state banks per examiner and state population to total examiners. The sign did 
not change and statistical significance of the coefficient did not appear sensitive to using these alternative 
definitions for supervisory resources where the dependent variable was the suspension rate. 
33 Regulators’ salaries are from American Bankers Association (1929), and bank executives’ average 
salaries are calculated using data from US Census of Business (1936). The difference between supervisor 
wages and bank executives yielded similar results to those reported in Table 4. The finance industry salary 
data are for 1935, the first year that a census of the banking industry was conducted in the U.S.  
34 When surveyed in 1929, at least 11 state bank supervisors explicitly mentioned that salaries were an 
important factor in attracting and retaining competent and qualified examiners. Some even suggested 
linking their pay to that of vice-presidents and treasurers of large banking institutions (American Bankers 
Association 1929). See also Board of Governors (1931, vol.6, pp.82, 91-3).   20 
 
thorough examinations of banks and better control the scope of bad loans and investments 
(assets). Moreover, states that committed more resources to their departments by having more 
examiners relative to the number or size of banks were better able to protect the money of 
depositors by reducing the amount of suspended deposits. This result is consistent with the view 
that examiners added value by focusing on large failures, thereby protecting depositors’ claims.  
 
B. Endogeneity of regulation 
 
It is possible that banking regulations are endogenous and therefore correlated with the 
error term. The public interest theory of regulation supports the notion that endogeneity may be 
present because banking distress galvanizes lawmakers to change regulations where the social 
costs of bank failures are greatest (Kroszner and Strahan 1999, 2001). Recent crises in emerging 
market and transitional economies also support the idea that regulations are often forged in 
response to crisis (Calomiris and Powell 2001; Neyapti and Dincer 2000).
35  
To deal with the possibility that state bank regulations are endogenous, we first construct 
instruments for branching laws and the prudential regulations, recognizing that regulations were 
shaped by the political economy of the period, and were hence the product of interest-group 
influence and public concern over the failure of many rural banks in the 1920s (Mitchener 2001). 
In states where they were more effectively organized, interest groups (representing bank 
customers, competitors of banks, and the banks themselves) were successful in obtaining banking 
regulations (such as prohibitions on branch banking) consistent with their private-interest 
motives.
36 Moreover, states that experienced severe rural bank crises during the 1920s or that had 
experimented with state deposit insurance systems (and had seen these systems fail) were more 
                                                           
35 A Hausman specification test failed to reject the null hypothesis that the regulatory variables are 
exogenous at standard significance levels. Comparing the constrained and unconstrained models, the Chi-
squared statistic = 0.15. 
36 Although branching activity expanded in states where it was permitted, the number of states permitting 
statewide branching did not grow in the 1920s, in part due to the lobbying of small, unit bankers to prevent 
its spread (Board of Governors 1931, vol.9).    21 
 
likely than other states to respond by changing prudential regulations such as reserve 
requirements.  
As the Appendix describes in more detail, we use political and historical factors as 
instrumental variables for 1929 regulations. The R-squared in the first-stage regressions for 
capital requirements, reserve requirements, and states prohibiting branching are 0.22, 0.65, and 
0.40, respectively, and the signs on most variables in the first stage are as predicted.
37 Column 1 
of Table 6 shows that, after instrumenting, the coefficients on the supervisors’ length of term, the 
power to liquidate insolvent banks and charter banks, and branch banking maintain their 
statistical significance, although the coefficient on the reserve requirements is no longer 
statistically significant. To test explicitly whether banking distress of the 1920s played a more 
direct role in influencing financial stability during the Depression, Column 2 includes the 
percentage of bank failures averaged over the 1921-28 period in the IV regression specification.
38 
If Depression-era failures were a continuation of the banking distress of the 1920s, then the sign 
on this coefficient will be positive and statistically significant. However, despite entering with the 
correct expected sign, the coefficient is statistically insignificant at conventional levels. We can 
conclude that the failures of the 1920s did not have an independent impact on those that occurred 
during the Depression once regulation, supervision, and industry structure are taken into account. 
As a second method for dealing with the endogeneity of regulation, we re-estimate 
equation (1) using the 1924 values of the prudential regulations and branching laws; endogeneity 
should no longer be a problem since the regulatory characteristics are predetermined. As Column 
3 shows, the results are similar to those reported in Table 3. The coefficient on reserve 
                                                           
37 For example, the first-stage results show that: (1) the coefficient on the share of small banks in a state is 
negatively associated with the states permitting statewide branching, indicating that small, unit bankers 
wanted to protect their geographical monopolies; (2) the coefficient representing inter-industry competition 
is positive for the capital requirement regression since insurers wanted to block small banks from brokering 
insurance (which they were legally permitted to do beginning in the 1920s); and (3) states passed higher 
reserve requirements in response to experiments with failed deposit insurance schemes. 
38 It is possible, for example, that the banking distress of the Depression was merely a continuation of the 
rural distress of the 1920s. This argument has been widely discussed in the literature, but has not been 
resolved (Friedman and Schwartz 1963; Temin 1976; Stauffer 1981; White 1983). Data on bank failures 
from the 1920s are computed from Federal Reserve Bulletin (September 1937).   22 
 
requirements is once again statistically significant at conventional levels and branch banking 
appears to have lowered suspension rates. Overall, the robustness checks in this section do not 
alter the basic findings.  
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The dual banking system of the 19
th century locked in a regulatory structure that 
encouraged institutional experimentation. States responded by creating banking departments that 
enforced an array of prudential standards and operated with widely different powers and 
resources. This was not necessarily a recipe for disaster as experimentation could have led to the 
evolution of better standards. But, as is the case today, banking laws in the 1920s emerged in 
response to the lobbying of interest groups (banks, their customers, and their competitors) and in 
response to earlier periods of banking instability. Small, unit bankers had derailed efforts to 
overhaul the banking system at the national level and blocked interstate banking. Only in states 
where unit banks had a weaker presence and where competition with national banks was intense 
were lawmakers able to pass intrastate  branching laws. Capital requirements and reserve 
requirements were likewise influenced by the interplay of private and public interests. The 
experience of state banks during the Depression suggests that implementing “best-practice” 
regulatory and supervisory arrangements across borders and creating a unified regulatory 
framework may prove to be intractable. Pre-existing regulatory structures create powerful 
incentives for private interests to protect regulations that undermine stability. 
   The give-and-take of the political process at the state level permitted the evolution of 
many poorly structured regulatory and supervisory regimes, and some states ended up adopting 
regulations that undermined the stability of their banking systems. For example, those states that 
prohibited branch banking (in part due to the influence of small, unit bankers) and that responded 
to the banking crisis of the 1920s by instituting strict reserve requirements experienced higher 
failure rates for their state-chartered financial institutions during the Great Depression. Moreover,   23 
 
some states’ banking departments were slow to institute the procedures, policies, and features of 
the older, more established Comptroller’s Office in their banking departments, while others 
adopted an institutional design that enhanced their ability to compete with the national regulators. 
Those states that had lengthened the terms of their banking supervisors in order to insulate 
regulators from political influence also made it more attractive for the banking industry to lobby 
bank supervisors with discretionary authority. Longer term-lengths had counterproductive 
consequences for financial stability as these states experienced higher state bank suspension rates 
of assets from 1929-33. On the other hand, those states that granted supervisors the authority to 
liquidate banks without first appointing a court receiver avoided the deleterious effects of delayed 
liquidation and experienced greater stability. Finally, states that endowed their supervisors with 
more resources were better able to manage the size of bank suspensions and protect depositor 
claims.   24 
 
APPENDIX. INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES FOR BANK REGULATIONS 
 
Competing theories of regulation have been shown to be good predictors of regulatory 
outcomes (Kroszner and Strahan 1998). To capture elements of the private-interest theory or 
economic theory of regulation (where outcomes are determined by interest groups who expend 
resources for private gain), competition between state banks of different sizes (intra-industry 
competition) and competition between banks and non-bank financial service providers (inter-
industry competition) are used as instrumental variables.
39 Small banks (often rural in location) 
had local monopolies based on geography in the 1920s, and according to this theory of regulation, 
would have spent resources on influencing politicians who control entry and exit into banking 
markets (e.g. capital requirements and branching laws).
40 And insurance companies in the 1920s 
may have been willing to expend resources to restrain bank competition because of the growth of 
group banking (which enabled banks to offer an array of services including investment and 
insurance underwriting) and legal changes that permitted commercial banks in some states to 
broker insurance in small towns. The private-interest theory of regulation also suggests that small 
firms, dependent on bank credit, would favor the removal of restrictions on branching or high 
capital requirements if it reduced market power or improved efficiency and resulted in the 
delivery of lower-cost loans. The percentage of manufacturing establishments in the state with 
fewer than 20 employees in 1919 is therefore included to capture the influence of the small 
                                                           
39 The percentage of a state’s state-chartered banks located in counties where the average deposits per bank 
was in the lowest third of all counties in the U.S. in 1920 is used to capture the influence that small banks 
had on 1929 regulatory outcomes. Data on the share of small banks are computed from an ICPSR data set 
originally authored by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1960). Employment in the insurance 
industry relative to the total for insurance and banking (measured in percentage terms) in 1919 is included 
to proxy for inter-industry competition. Figures for 1920 employment in insurance and banking are the 
revised series published in the 1930 U.S. Census of Population. Employment in the insurance industry 
includes both officers and insurance agents. While there were certainly large national insurance companies 
operating across state borders in the 1920s, the presence of smaller insurance firms and the inclusion of 
agents in the employment-based measure led to considerable variation in insurance employment across 
states. The measure of interest-group influence is based on data from the beginning of the 1920s, since 
changes in bank regulations during the decade could have altered the relative size or influence of interest 
groups.  
40 White (1983), Kroszner and Strahan (1998), Abrams and Settle (1993), and Economides, Hubbard, and 
Palia (1996) argue that small banks are concerned with the erosion of economic rents if larger urban banks 
are allowed to compete with them directly through branching.   25 
 
business lobby on regulatory outcomes.
41 Interaction terms were also included to proxy the 
response of interest groups to sector-specific stresses.
42 
  To capture elements of the public-interest theory of regulation, where, for example, 
legislators would respond to public concern over the safety or solvency of the banking system by 
raising capital or reserve requirements, the average failure rate for state banks over the period 
1921-28 is used as an instrument. A dummy variable for the eight states that experimented with 
government-created liability-insurance schemes in the 1920s is also included since state 
legislators may have responded to the failure of these systems and their high social costs by 
changing other prudential regulations.
43 Finally, to reflect political-institutional theories of 
regulation, the number of years from 1921-28 where one party occupied both chambers of the 
state legislature and the governorship and the number of years from 1921-28 that Democrats 
controlled the upper house and the governorship (reflecting differences in party ideology) are 
used as instrumental variables.
44 
                                                           
41 Data on small firms are revised from those reported in 1920, and are from the 1930 U.S. Census of 
Manufactures. 
42 The percentage of small state banks was interacted with the bank failure rate for state banks in the 1920s 
to see if the influence of small banks changed as a result of the size of this lobby. The variable proxying for 
the importance of small industry was multiplied by the (1920-28) average business failure rate. Lacking 
data on failure rates by state for insurance companies, the measure for relative insurance industry 
employment was squared to capture the dynamic-lobbying effects of insurance companies. 
43 North Dakota, South Dakota, and Nebraska made membership in the system compulsory whereas 
Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Mississippi, and Washington did not.  
44 Since the number of years Democrats controlled the lower house is highly collinear with Democratic 
control of the upper house (0.94), the lower house is excluded from the regressions. Data on political 
control of the legislative and executive branches are from the ICPSR data file authored by Burnham (1985). 
Nebraska’s unicameral legislature was treated as an upper house chamber. The results do not appear 
sensitive to the inclusion of Nebraska. Data from ICPSR are given only in those years for which a new 
election was held. Most states held elections every other year; however, some held elections only every 
third or fourth year. New Jersey and New York held elections every year.   26 
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Table 1. Banks by Charter Status 
      
 
All Commercial 
Banks State  Banks National  Banks 
      
Total Failures, 1929-33  9,440 7,429 2,011
      
   Share of All Bank Failures (%)    79% 21%
      
Average Failure Rate (1929-33)  9.2% 10.2% 6.8%
      
Standard Deviation of Failure Rate  10.1 11.2 8.9
      
% of Deposits in Failed Banks  
    (Average 1929-33)  5.6% 8.0% 4.1%
      
Standard Deviation of % of Deposits
In Failed Banks  10.3 14.6 12.8
      
Total Deposits ($billions), 1929  49.4 27.8 21.6
      
   Share of Total Deposits     56.3% 43.7%
      
Total Banks in 1929  24,970 17,440 7,530
      
   Share of Total Banks    69.8% 30.2%
      
Deposits per Bank ($millions), 1929 1.98 1.59 2.87
      
Sources: Calculations use bank suspension data from Federal Reserve Bulletin, 
September 1937; number of banks by charter status and deposit data are from Board 
of Governors, Federal Reserve System (1959). 
    
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics on Bank Regulation and Financial Supervision 
        
 Standard
Variable  Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
        
Capital Requirement in 1929 ($1000) 
(Minimum Charter Capital Required)           25          16.3  0            100 
Reserve Requirement, 1929  15% 3.2% 7% 20%
Branching Banks as a Percent of All 
Banks, 1929  5% 9% 0% 46%
        
Number of States with Statewide 
Branching, 1929  8    
Number of States Explicitly Prohibiting 
Branching, 1929  23     
        
Length of State Bank Supervisor’s Term 
(years)  3.8 1.0 2 6
Banks per Examiner, June 1929  29.4 19.0 1.5 75.7
Supervisors'  Salary ($), 1929  5,957 2,113 3,600 12,000
Examiners' Salary ($), 1929  3,034 625 2,000 5,100
Assets per Examiner, 1929  27,103 22,343 1,510 140,842
        
Percent of States Whose Supervisors 
Have Sole Power to Charter Banks  41.7%     
Percent of States Whose Supervisors 
Have Sole Power to Liquidate Banks  60.4%    
        
Four-firm concentration ratio (%),  
All Banks, 1929  28.4% 15.5% 7.3% 82.5%
Share of Small Banks Located in State, 
1929 21% 22% 0% 87%
        
Notes: Medians rather than means are given for minimum charter capital and reserve 
requirements. Capital requirements are those that applied to the smallest municipality in 
the state. Reserve requirements are for the demand deposits of country banks. The small 
banks measure is defined as the percentage of state-chartered banks in a state that are 
located in counties where the average deposits per bank are in the lowest third of all U.S. 
counties. 
 
Sources: Bank failure data are from Federal Reserve Bulletin (September 1937). Data on 
branching laws and reserve requirements are from Federal Reserve Bulletin (November 
1928, February and December 1929, and September 1930). Capital requirements and 
data for constructing the four-firm concentration ratio are from Polk's Bankers 
Encyclopedia Co. (1929). Data on length of supervisor’s term, banks and assets per 
examiner, salaries of supervisory staff, and charter and liquidation authority are from 
American Bankers Association (1929). The share of small banks located in a state is 
calculated using data from FDIC (1960). Data on finance industry salaries are from U.S. 
Census of Business (1936). 
 








Table 3. Explaining the Variation in State Bank Suspension Rates, 1929-1933
(Dependent Variable: Annual Average Suspension Rate for state-chartered, non-member banks)
Independent Variable Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4
Failure rate for national banks 1.089 *** 1.013 ***
(standard error) 0.093 0.128
[p value] 0.000 0.000
Sole authority to charter banks 3.502 ** 1.087 1.481 1.513
1.722 1.045 1.151 1.038
0.043 0.299 0.200 0.146
Sole authority to liquidate banks -5.363 ** -3.414 *** -3.639 *** -3.659 ***
2.191 1.038 1.059 1.033
0.015 0.001 0.001 0.000
Supervisors' Term 1.873 * 1.592 *** 1.612 *** 1.611 ***
1.048 0.492 0.524 0.517
0.075 0.001 0.002 0.002
Banks per Examiner -0.059 -0.019 -0.018 -0.018
0.060 0.027 0.029 0.029
0.322 0.487 0.527 0.527
Capital Requirement -0.057 -0.013 -0.030 -0.031
($1000s) 0.057 0.030 0.028 0.028
0.323 0.655 0.279 0.267
Reserve Requirement 0.087 0.336 *** 0.403 *** 0.403 ***
0.357 0.129 0.153 0.152
0.808 0.010 0.009 0.009
State banks with branches (%) -0.186 * -0.128 *** -0.129 ** -0.129 ***
0.102 0.044 0.060 0.060
0.070 0.004 0.032 0.031
Bank Industry Structure Controls NO NO YES YES
Year Dummies NO NO YES YES
Adjusted R-Squared 0.07 0.75 0.76 0.19
Number of Observations 240 240 240 240
Notes: Industry structure controls are a four-bank concentration ratio for state banks, the average
deposits for state banks, the (average) percentage of state bank assets that were cash or government
bonds (risky assets), and the average capital-asset ratio for state banks. Regressions also include
a constant term and state characteristics described in the text (not reported). Weighted least squares
regressions use total banks in each state as weights. Standard errors are Eicker-White
heteroskedasticity consistent. Stars indicate significance at 1(***), 5(**), and 10(*) percent levels,
respectively. The sample period is 1929-33. The dependent variable in column 4 is the difference
between the state and national failure rates.
Sources: See Tables 1 and 2.   
 
Table 4. Panel A: Correlation Matrix for Regulatory and Supervisory Variables    
              
  Chartering Liquidation States prohibiting Supervisor's Banks per Capital   Reserve 
  authority authority branching  term  length  examiner  requirement requirement
Chartering authority  1.00            
Liquidation authority  0.29  1.00       
States prohibiting branching  0.05  0.19 1.00  
Supervisor's term length  -0.02  -0.02 0.05 1.00  
Banks per examiner  -0.01 0.00 0.37 0.38 1.00 
Capital requirement  -0.16  0.04 0.06 -0.37 -0.22  1.00

















    
 
Table 5. Alternative Measures of Banking Distress & Sensitivity Tests
Dependent Variable
Suspended Suspended Suspended Suspended
Independent Variable Deposits Assets Deposits Assets
National bank distress 0.208 *** 0.225 *** 0.211 *** 0.225 ***
(standard error) 0.060 0.061 0.064 0.064
[p value] 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
Sole authority to charter banks 0.258 0.228 0.323 0.341
0.232 0.240 0.224 0.228
0.269 0.343 0.151 0.136
Sole authority to liquidate banks -0.304 -0.289 -0.361 -0.406
0.251 0.261 0.259 0.259
0.227 0.270 0.164 0.119
Supervisor's Term (years) 0.421 *** 0.386 *** 0.483 *** 0.472 ***
0.119 0.121 0.119 0.119
0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
Banks per Examiner (1928) 0.009 0.008 0.010 * 0.009
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
0.128 0.166 0.066 0.108
Capital Requirement 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006
($1000s) 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007
0.302 0.382 0.304 0.391
Reserve Requirement 0.089 ** 0.082 ** 0.117 *** 0.112 ***
0.042 0.043 0.041 0.041
0.037 0.056 0.005 0.007
State banks with branches (%) -0.047 *** -0.044 *** -0.038 ** -0.036 **
0.015 0.015 0.017 0.017
0.002 0.004 0.029 0.038
Assets per bank examiner 0.009 0.009 *
   ($1000s) 0.005 0.006
0.103 0.087
Wage Differential: Examiners - -0.197 -0.216
Finance Industry Executives 0.147 0.145
   ($1000s) 0.181 0.139
Adjusted R-Squared 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.77
Number of Observations 240 240 240 240
Notes: WLS Estimation (with a constant term) and Eicker-White correction for standard errors. Bank industry 
structure control variables and year dummies were included in all the regressions shown in the table. See 
Table 3 for industry controls and weights, and Tables 1 and 2 for sources. The sample period is 1929-33.
Columns 1 & 3 use the (log) share of deposits of state-chartered, non-member banks that are suspended as
the dependent variable. Columns 2 & 4 uses the (log) share of loans and investments that are suspended in 
state-chartered, non-member banks as the dependent variable. National bank distress corresponds 
to the (log) share of suspended deposits in national banks (columns 1&3) and the (log) share of suspended
assets in national banks (columns 2 & 4).   
Table 6. Endogeneity & Instrumental Variables Estimation of Suspension Rates, 1929-1933
(Dependent Variable: Annual Average Suspension Rate for state-chartered, non-member banks)
Lagged
Independent Variable IV Estimation (1) IV Estimation (2) Regulation
Failure rate for national banks 1.079 *** 1.077 *** 1.002 ***
(standard error) 0.149 0.149 0.128
[p value] 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sole authority to charter banks 0.209 0.025 0.582
1.574 1.552 1.060
0.895 0.987 0.584
Sole authority to liquidate banks -3.282 *** -3.222 *** -3.659 ***
1.123 1.140 1.046
0.004 0.005 0.001
Supervisor's Term (years) 1.672 *** 1.604 ** 1.783 ***
0.630 0.661 0.539
0.009 0.016 0.001
Banks per Examiner -0.026 -0.025 -0.028
0.034 0.035 0.029
0.437 0.470 0.327
Capital Requirement 0.069 0.071 -0.049
   (in $1000s) 0.138 0.137 0.031
0.617 0.607 0.120
Reserve Requirement -0.208 -0.217 0.313 **
0.381 0.381 0.130
0.586 0.569 0.017
Statewide Branching Permitted -5.022 -5.183 * -4.387 ***
3.206 3.110 1.355
0.119 0.097 0.001
State Bank Suspension Rate, 1921-28 0.157
0.291
0.589
Industry Structure Controls YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Adjusted R-Squared 0.74 0.74 0.77
Number of Observations 235 235 240
Notes: A constant term was also included. Instruments were constructed for bank regulation 
(branching laws, reserve requirements, and capital requirements) variables. Wyoming is excluded
due to missing values for some of the instrumental variables. Column 3 is weighted least squares
with robust standard errors, where the regulatory variables are fixed at their 1924 values.
The legal status of statewide branching is substituted for state banks with branches.
Sources: See Tables 1 and 2, and Appendix 1 for details on instrumental variables.    
Figure 1. Bank Failure Rates during the Great Depression 
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Source: Calculations based on Federal Reserve Bulletin, September 1937 and Board of Governors, Federal 
Reserve System (1959). 